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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880375-CA 
v. : 
JAY CHARLES WADE and : Category 2 
WILLIAM CLIFFORD BARTLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404, a third degree felony, for theft of property with value 
of more than $250 and less than $1,000 following a jury trial in 
Seventh District Court, San Juan County, the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, judge, presiding. Defendant's judgment and commitment 
were entered on May 10, 1988 (R. 165-166). His notice of appeal 
was filed on June 8, 1988 (R. 179). 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and S 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant Bartley and his co-defendant were 
properly stopped while driving their vehicles, which led to 
discovery of stolen property and their subsequent arrest. 
2. Whether the trial court properly admitted into 
evidence testimony that the sheriff located a gun in Bartley's 
belt at the time of his arrest and testimony that the defendant's 
vehicles were taken without authorization from the impound yard 
in which they were stored after their arrest* 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978: 
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if 
he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § "76-6-412 (1978). 
Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen 
property.—(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or 
services exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm 
or an operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly 
weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the 
person of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or 
services is more than $250 but 
not more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before 
convicted of theft of property or 
services valued at $250 or less; 
or 
(iii) When the property taken is a 
stallion, mare, colt, gelding, 
cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, 
calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, 
jennuy, swine or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value 
of the property stolen was more than 
$100 but does not exceed $250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value 
of the property stolen was $100 or 
less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a 
violation of subsection (1), of section 76-6--
408 may bring an action against any person 
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mentioned in (d) for three times the amount 
of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a): 
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; or 
2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is 
one excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by 
offer or was apparent from the context within 
which questions were asked. 
Utah R. Evid. 401: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a): 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information dated December 30, 
1986, v/ith having committed theft of drip gas valued at more than 
$250 and less than $1,000, a third degree felony, a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 1). Arraignment was held on 
December 27, 1986, and January 7, 1987 (R. 7, 13). Preliminary 
hearing was held on February 25, 1987, at which time defendant 
was bound over, with his co-defendant Jay Charles Wade, to stand 
trial on the charges (R. 2, 22). At the arraignment in district 
court, defendant entered his plea of not guilty (R. 25). 
Defendant was tried by a jury on April 12 and 13, 1988, 
and convicted on April 13, 1988 (R. 154-160). Defendant was 
sentenced to serve 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison and ordered 
to pay restitution (R. 163, 165-166). 
On May 10, 1988, defendant entered into a plea 
agreement involving other charges against him (R. 167-171). In 
this agreement, defendant pled guilty to some of the regaining 
charges against him, in exchange for, inter alia, the State's 
recommendation that the sentences on the new convictions be 
served concurrently with the sentence in the instant case (R. 
170). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed on June 8, 1988 (R. 
179). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 27, 1986, Frankie Knuckles was near Bug 
Point in Southern Utah, checking on various oil tanks in the 
course of his employment (T. 206). At approximately 10:30 p.m., 
he saw three pickups with trailers and oil tanks driving towara 
the oil fields (T. 209). At: trialf Frankie Knuckles identified 
the trucks driven by defendants as two of the three trucks he saw 
that night (T. 209). When the trucks passed Frankie Knuckles, 
they did not bear a noticeable odor, and the tanks rattled as if 
they were empty (T. 211). Frankie Knuckles called Charlie 
Williams, who was employed to transport gas from the oil fields 
(T. 175-176), and told him what he had seen (T. 209). Mr. 
Williams then called the sheriff's office and reported the three 
trucks (T. 57). He also called Robert Knuckles, an oil pumper at 
the Wintershall site to inform him that he thought someone was 
stealing drip gas (T. 72, 254). 
Mr. Williams explained at trial that he thought the 
activities of the three trucks were suspect because he generally 
knew about the legitimate gas transactions in the area. In order 
to transport gas, the trucker must present to the gas field 
employees a Mrun ticket,- which these men had not. Further he 
found it concerning that the trucks were travelling so late at 
Drip gas was described repeatedly at trial. It is a clear 
condensed form of gas (T. 83, 104, 114), with a very noticeable 
odor (T. 178-179, 257) and it is distinguishable from diesel fuel 
and gasoline(T. 114, 178-179). It is produced in tanks, which 
also contain some water and paraffin, which are by-products of 
the condensation process (T. 181). Drip gas is used as a 
cleaning agent, and some people use it in their vehicles, but it 
can be very destructive to engines (T. 194, 271). 
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night (T. 202, 203). Theft of drip gas had occurred repeatedly 
prior to the night of the instant crime (T. 202). 
Soon after Mr. Williams called the sheriff's office, 
San Juan County Sheriff Seth Rigby Wright received a telephone 
call from a police dispatcher, informing him that Charlie 
Williams had called to report three pickup trucks pulling 
trailers and farm size (300-1,000 gallon) oil tanks heading 
toward Bug Point (T. 56-58), where drip gas had repeatedly been 
stolen (T. 177, 202). Sheriff Wright called Deputy Kirby, who 
picked up the sheriff half an hour later and drove him toward Bug 
Point (T. 58). On the way, the sheriff and deputy spoke with 
Charles Williams and Robert Knuckles, who were parked at the 
entrance area of the canyon (T. 58). 
The sheriff and the deputy then drove to the point of 
arrest, driving without lights to avoid detection for the last 
two and a half miles prior to stopping, and parked (T. 61). They 
arrived at approximately midnight, and fifteen or twenty minutes 
later three sets of headlights approached from about a mile and a 
half away (T. 62, 63). The sheriff left his deputy in the truck, 
instructing him to turn on a red light when the defendants were 
near so that they would stop (T. 63). The sheriff then walked 
about fifty yards down the road to wait (T. 63). The first car 
that was stopped was a pickup with a tank in the back of the 
truck and was hauling a trailer with three oil tanks; the truck 
was driven by co-defendant Jay Charles Wade (T. 63). The second 
vehicle that stopped was a pickup hauling a trailer carrying a 
large oil tank; it was driven by defendant Bartley (T. 65). 
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The sheriff noted that the tanks and defendants' 
clothes bore a distinctive odor (T. 68, 69). From his experience 
working in the oil fields, he identified the smell as drip gas 
(T. 132-133). 
The third set of headlight turned around prior to 
reaching the location where the sheriff was waiting (T. 65). 
After frisking defendants and taking a pistol from defendant 
Bartley's pants (T. 80), the sheriff handcuffed the defendants, 
put them in the police car, and began pursuing the third vehicle 
(T. 66). The third vehicle was never located by the police, but 
the tracks marking the place it turned around were located later 
that morning (T. 70, 129-30). Defendants were asked about the 
third truck, but acted as if they knew nothing of it, and were 
not interrogated further (T. 78). 
After failed attempts to locate the third truck, the 
sheriff and deputy drove back and met Charlie Williams and Robert 
Knuckles, who identified the tank from which the drip gas has 
been stolen that night (T. 70). The sheriff and Robert Knuckles 
went to the tanks, owned by Wintershall Oil & Gas, and found one 
tank which had wet ground surrounding it and paraffin (a 
substance typically found in drip gas tanks) on its side and on 
2 
the road near it (T. 72). 
A state criminologist, using an infrared 
spectophotometer, compared samples of the liquid on some of 
defendants' clothes with a sample of drip gas from the 
2 
Charles Williams explained that the area surrounding the tank 
indicated that someone had drained the water and paraffin out of 
the tank when they stole the drip gas (T. 181-182). 
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Wintershall tank, and found that the samples were comparable in 
composition (T. 228-229). 
There were footprints and tire tracks near the tank and 
a strong odor of drip gas (T. 71-72). The criminologist 
explained that his comparison of defendants' footwear on the 
night of the crime was consistent with photographs of the 
footprints at the scene of the crime. (T. 225). Deputy Kirby 
compared one of the tire track photographs and one of the tires 
from one of the defendants' vehicles, and concluded thcit the tire 
was consistent with the track (T. 244). 
Robert Knuckles, who was in charge of gauging oil at 
the Wintershall site, informed the sheriff that the seal on the 
tank was not a company seal (T. 73). He then checked the level 
of the tank, and found that it was practically empty (T. 258). 
The value of the drip gas taken was at least $929.50 (T. , 263). 
No authorization was given for the draining of that tank, and it 
should not have been emptied without the knowledge and signature 
of Robert Knuckles or one of his employees (T. 260). He 
explained at trial that this tank was the only one in the area 
that they investigated in relation to this crime because it had 
been stolen from recently, and because, given the time frame 
between when Frankie Knuckles spotted the trucks and the time 
that they arrived at the sheriff's car, that tank was probably 
Testimony explained that a seal on an oil tank must be replaced 
once it is opened (T. 73), that the seal legally must reflect the 
person or company who last accessed the tank (T. 261), and that 
the seal found at that time by Mr. Knuckles could not have been 
placed there legitimately, because it was a seal from Union Oil 
of California, a company with which the Wintershall site was not 
transacting business at the time of the crime (T. 261), 
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the one that had been stolen from (T. 284). Robert Knuckles 
testified that he recognized the smell of the drip gas in 
defendants' tanks as the smell of the drip gas from the 
Wintershall tank (T. 269). 
On the morning after defendants' arrest, the sheriff 
went to examine their vehicles in the impound lot (T. 83). He 
noted that drip gas was leaking from one of the tanks, and found 
that the 500 gallon tank on defendant Wade's truck was full, 
another 500 gallon tank towed by the Wade truck was about 85% 
full, and that the leaking thousand gallon tank appeared to be 
4 
close to full (T. 84-85). He found in the Bartley truck a 
"Union Oil of California" oil tank seal like the one placed on 
the oil tank at the Wintershall site by the drip gas thieves (T. 
115). 
During defendants' case, Alva Rockwell, uncle to 
defendant Wade, testified that his nephew made arrangements to 
obtain 500 gallons of diesel fuel combined with some crude oil 
from him, and that he had made a trade with defendant Bartley in 
which Bartley would receive a trailer and between 1,000 and 1,500 
gallons of diesel fuel from him (T. 302-308). He testified that 
the deal was made in November, and that he expected defendant 
Bartley to pick up the trailer and gas then, and did not know 
when defendant Bartley picked the trailer and gas up until after 
defendants' arrest (T. 323). He testified that the fuel was oily 
and did not have much crude in it, and was used in all kinds of 
4 
Prom the cross-examination at T. 86-87, it appears that the 
1,000 gallon tank was towed by the truck driven by defendant 
Bartley. 
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vehicles (T. 307, 320). 
Defendant Wade testified that on the night of the 
crime, he agreed to help defendant Bartley haul some oil from 
Alva Rockwell's house (T. 326). He testified that he obtained 
500 gallons in his own truck and that he took it home. He then 
drove to defendant Bartley's truck with some empty tanks, because 
defendant Bartley could not haul the oil up the hill to Bug Point 
(T. 329). He said that when they arrived at the tank that 
defendant Bartley had left on the road prior to going to Wade's 
for assistance, they pumped some of the fuel from the Bartley 
tanks into the empty Wade tanks (T. 329). He explained that they 
used a pump to distribute the fuel between the two drivers, they 
began driving, and were subsequently arrested (T. 331). The 
sheriff, his deputy, and the wrecker driver (who transported the 
trucks to the impound yard) did not see pumps inside either truck 
that night (T. 84, 169, 293). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon Sheriff Wright's information, he had at 
least a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in 
But see T. 307, where Mr. Rockwell testifies: 
A well, it appeared to be diesel. It was oily 
and - - but it had this crude oil smell. It didn't 
look like it had much crude oil in it, but, you know, 
that smell is predominant. And it - - I run [sic] as 
much as I could, but I ruined my engine and - -. 
(T. 307). 
It should be noted that only some of the fuel supposedly 
given by Mr. Rockwell to defendants came from the supply 
described in the above-quoted paragraph (T. 307). Mr. Rockwell 
also apparently bought, stored, and mixed a great deal of fuel 
for his diesel truck (T. 314-316). 
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criminal activity when he and his co-defendant were stopped; 
following the stop, based upon additional observations, Sheriff 
Wright had probable cause to arrest defendant. 
Evidence that defendant was wearing a handgun on the 
night of his arrest and that the trucks he and his co-defendant 
were driving were stolen from the impound yard following the 
arrest was probative and not unduly prejudicial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SHERIFF HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION, BASED 
ON OBJECTIVE FACTS, TO JUSTIFY AN 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP. 
Defendant contends that he was improperly stopped by 
Sheriff Wright and that his subsequent arrest was not supported 
by probable cause. 
Co-defendant Jay Charles Wade, acting pro se, submitted 
a motion to suppress evidence gathered as a result of defendants' 
arrest on the grounds that: 
Said stop was made without probable 
cause and without a warrant. The stop 
was not pursuant to a structured "road-
block" plan. 
The stop-and-search, as conducted, 
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of These United 
States of America, 
(R. 71-72). A memorandum accompanying the motion explained 
further defendant's view of the prosecution's acquisition of the 
evidence against him (R. 73-76). The State opposed this motion 
with a memorandum (R. 89-98). A public defender was appointed to 
represent defendant Wade (R. 79), and after a hearing, the motion 
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to suppress was denied (R. 99). Defendant Bartley was appointed 
his present counsel on March 8, 1988 (R. 107), and then moved for 
the suppression of the evidence obtained when he was arrested, 
adopting the evidence and arguments previously submitted by 
defendant Wade (R. 119-120). Defense counsel addressed the 
motion prior to trial, and the trial court denied it (T. 2-3). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sheriff 
Wright testified that on December 27, 1986, he was called by a 
dispatcher and given information that Charles Williams (T. 19) 
had called in and reported that three vehicles with trailers and 
tanks on them were driving toward the oil wells at between 10:30 
and 11:00 p.m. (Suppression Hearing, hereinafter "S.H.", at 3). 
The sheriff explained that Mr. Williams had received a call 
concerning activity in the area of the oil fields, and was going 
there to investigate it himself (S.H. 19). The sheriff told him 
to stay out of the area, and that the sheriff would handle it 
(S.H. 19) He testified that when he and his deputy were on their 
way to the oil fields, they spoke with Charles Williams, a worker 
in the oil fields, and Robert Knuckles (S.H. 4). 
Sheriff Wright had spoken with Mr. Williams twice 
before the night of the instant crime concerning the theft of 
drip gas (S.H. 18). During those previous conversations, the 
sheriff instructed Mr. Williams to contact the sheriff if he got 
something the police could Hput [their] teeth intoH (S.H. 18). 
The sheriff and deputy drove to the Bug Point area and apparently 
intended to stop every vehicle that came by that night (S.H. 9-
10). 
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About fifteen minutes after the sheriff and his deputy 
had parked their car, three pairs of headlights appeared on the 
road about one and a half miles away (S.H. 8, 21). He testified 
that when defendants pulled up, the trucks were "lugged down" and 
moving slowly (S.H. 11). He noticed the smell of crude oil on 
the Wade vehicle, and then the Bartley vehicle was stopped (S.H. 
11). The Wade and Bartley vehicles matched the descriptions of 
the trucks described by Charles Williams (S.H. 9, 22). The 
sheriff noted that it was unusual for the pickups with trailers 
and tanks to be hauling in the oil field area, because the oil 
from the fields was generally hauled by small tanker trucks and 
semis (S.H. 26-27). 
When defendant Bartley exited the truck and was patted 
down, the deputy took a pistol from the waistband of defendant's 
pants (S.H. 24). Defendants were then arrested (S.H. 24). 
From the time that the police car was situated and 
waiting for defendants until the search for the third vehicle and 
examination of the Wintershall tank were complete, Sheriff Wright 
saw only one vehicle that was not involved in the investigation, 
that of Lowell Rockwell, who was in the area to check his animal 
traps (S.H. 20). 
Defendant's argument that he was improperly stopped 
while driving out of the area of the oil wells toward Bug Point 
is without merit. In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of 
"Crude" is apparently a synonym for drip gas. See T. 114 (drip 
gas is contrasted to refined oil); T. 304 (Alva Rockwell also 
apparently refers to drip gas as "crude"). 
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evidence uncovered as a result of a detention short of actual 
arrest and allowed a frisk incident to an on-street 
investigation. The stop of defendant, and his co-defendant Wade, 
was supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity and, therefore, was legitimate. 
The test to be employed in determining the validity of 
a stop is characterized as one of founded suspicion or reasonable 
suspicion as distinct from probable cause. Unarticulated 
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient to justify a detention. 
State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). An investigative 
stop if only permissible "when the officers 'have a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual 
[stopped] is involved in criminal activity.'" l^ i. at 719, 
quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
The United States Supreme Court again considered the 
right of an officer to conduct an investigation and make a 
detention and seizure based on evidence short of probable cause. 
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1962), an informant who was 
known to the officer advised him that a person in a nearby 
vehicle had narcotics and was carrying a concealed gun in his 
waistband. The officer approached the individual in the vehicle 
and requested him to open the door. The individual did not 
comply with the officer's request but rolled down the window 
whereupon the officer immediately reached in through the window 
and removed the weapon from the individual's waistband. He then 
arrested the person for unlawful possession of a weapon. 
Subsequent to the arrest, a full search revealed the possession 
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of heroin and other weapons. The Supreme Court upheld the 
actions of the officer finding them permissible under the Terry 
doctrine. The Court expanded the Terry doctrine by finding that 
a reasonable suspicion could be founded upon information provided 
by an informant rather than information directly observed by the 
officer conducting the investigation. 
Citing to the Terry case, this Court in State v. 
Trujiilo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987), repeated that a 
"police officer, in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner, may approach a person for purposes of 
investigation suspected criminal behavior even through there is 
not probable cause to make an arrest." Such appropriate 
circumstances have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1982), which states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
In the present case, the police officer was able to 
"point to specific, articulable facts which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude [the suspect] had committed or was 
about to commit a crime." State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3 
(Utah App. 1988), quoting, Trujiilo, 739 P.2d at 88. 
First, as detailed above, he had information from a 
known, reliable informant that three vehicles equipped with farm-
size tanks were driving into the Bug Point area late at night. 
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He had previously received information that repeated thefts of 
drip gas had occurred in that specific area. The lateness of the 
hour was alarming in that it was not during normal business hours 
for oil transactions. Sheriff Wright had been given a 
description of the trucks; the nature of the vehicles was unusual 
in that tankers or semi trucks are normally used to transport oil 
from the wells. The area is remote and not frequently used at 
that hour of the night; in fact, only one other vehicle was 
present in the area that night. 
Once the vehicles came into sight, Sheriff Wright 
observed that they were heavily laden, lugged down, and slow. As 
soon as the vehicles reached the location of the sheriff, he 
observed the noticeable, obnoxious odor of drip gas. He could 
also smell the oil product on the defendants themselves. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Sheriff Wright 
had at least a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had 
occurred. Consequently, he was justified in making the stop of 
the vehicles. Once the stop had occurred and he determined that 
the defendant's tanks did in fact contain drip gas, he has 
probable cause to make the arrest. Because the stop was 
justified based upon Terry reasonable suspicion standards, it is 
unnecessary to consider whether a "roadblock" was used. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
WERE CORRECT, AND IF ERROR, HARMLESS. 
During the trial, evidence was introduced indicating 
that a pistol was taken from defendant Bartley, who had tucked it 
into his pants prior to approaching the deputy's car (T. 67). 
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Evidence was also introduced that defendants' trucks, trailers, 
and tanks were stolen from the impound yard after the defendants 
were arrested (T. 116-120). The court allowed the testimony into 
evidence over objection (T. 81, 89, 120-122). No cautionary 
instructions were requested or given. 
On appeal, defendants cite Utah Rules of Evidence 402 
and 403, arguing that the trial court should have excluded the 
evidence because it was irrelevant and prejudicial (App.Br. 19-
22). 
The confiscation of defendant's gun was relevant to 
explain the circumstances of defendant's crime and arrest. See 
State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977) (defendant, 
charged with murder, could not complain that evidence of a rape 
occurring immediately after the murder was unduly prejudicial, 
because "the evidence concerning the rape . . . was so closely 
involved in the total picture of the crime, and defendant's 
possible motive for the killing, that it is difficult to see how 
it properly could have been excluded"); State v. Daniels, 584 
P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978) ("[E]vidence of other crimes allegedly 
committed by the defendant is not admissible if the purpose is to 
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a 
propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed the 
crime charged. However, if the evidence has relevancy to explain 
the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible 
for that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the 
defendant with another crime will not render it incompetent.") 
(Footnote omitted.) 
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After defendant Bartley was stopped, Sheriff Wright 
found a handgun tucked inside his belt. This evidence was 
admitted at trial over objection (T. 80-81). Additional evidence 
was admitted at trial, without objection, that Sheriff Wright 
located in Bartley's vehicle a 308 rifle and a pistol scabbard 
and belt (T. 76). Evidence of the pistol in Bartley's belt was 
not unduly prejudicial. First, evidence of another weapon and 
scabbard was admitted, which minimized the effect of the 
possession of the pistol. Second, simple possession of a weapon 
does not portray defendant as a "lawless, gunslinger" (App. Br. 
at 20), particularly when viewed in the context of the remote 
Southern Utah area and the lateness of the hour. 
The theft of the trucks and trailers subsequent to 
defendants' arrest was relevant to explain the absence of 
physical evidence at trial. As the result of the theft, the 
State was unable to determine the precise amount of drip gas or 
precise chemical content of the tanks. Other evidence was sent 
to the Utah State Crime Lab for analysis, including defendants' 
clothes and samples of drip gas from the site of the theft. As 
the trial court properly found, the jury was entitled to know why 
the State did not have the additional evidence (T. 120-21). 
Further, inasmuch as there was absolutely no evidence 
or implication that defendants arranged for or were involved in 
the theft of the trucks and trailers, the admission of this 
evidence was not prejudicial to them at all. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that the admission of 
the evidence of defendant's gun and the theft of the trucks and 
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trailers was error, because there was ample evidence of 
7 
defendants' guilt, it was harmless error. 
Defendants' trucks and apparently empty tanks were seen 
near the scene of numerous thefts of drip gas at around 10:30 
p.m. (T. 202, 206-211). One of the drip gas tanks in the oil 
field was drained by thieves that night (T. 258), and the value 
of the drip gas taken was at least $929.50 (T. 263). Defendants 
were arrested, and their tanks and clothes had the unique smell 
of drip gas (T. 68, 69, 132-133). Samples of the liquids on 
defendants' clothes matched the liquid in the tank that was 
drained by the thieves (T. 228-229). A tank seal was found in 
defendant Bartley's truck that was identical to a seal placed by 
the thieves on the tank that was illegally drained (T. 261, 115). 
Footprints and tire tracks at the scene were consistent with the 
footwear and tires of defendants (T. 71-72, 225, 244). 
Defendants were not authorized to take the gas (T. 202-203). 
Because the evidence of the defendants' guilt was very 
substantial, the impact of the contested evidence would have 
been, at most, minimal. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, William Clifford Bartley, was properly 
convicted of theft. For the foregoing reasons, and any 
Utah Rule of Evidence 103 provides, in part, "Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 
a substantial right of the party is affected . . . ." 
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additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of Utah 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
DATED this v£/ day of May, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
I BARBARA BEARNSON 
-A. 
^
A^ s^ istant Att<5rney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Lyle R. Anderson, attorney for defendant, P.O. Box 75, 
Monticello, Utah 84535, this.ZJL— day o f May' 1989* 
— — A ^ — 
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Mary Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: State v. Bartley, Case No. 880375-CA 
Supplemental Authorities 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
I filed the State's response brief on May 30, 1989 in 
the above-entitled case, but upon further reflection and 
consideration, I feel compelled to bring to the attention of this 
Court an additional issue. The issue was not raised by the 
appellant, but in candor with this Court, the issue should be 
considered and disposed of by this Court. First, the issue is of 
a constitutional dimension and should be decided as a matter of 
fairness and justice to the defendant. Second, as a practical 
matter, the issue could be the subject of a proceeding for post-
conviction relief and it would expedite the finality of this 
conviction to have the issue determined. Therefore, pursuant to 
R. Utah Ct. App. 24(j), I am filing the following supplemental 
authorities. I will advance argument during oral argument; 
alternatively, this Court may wish to request briefing on this 
issue. 
2 3 6 STATE CAPITOL SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 14 TELEPHONE: 8 0 1 - 5 3 8 - 1 0 1 5 
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Relevant parts of the record: 
Transcript at 77-78: 
Q [Prosecutor during direct examination 
of Sheriff Wright] You placed the 
individuals under arrest? 
A [Sheriff Wright] Yes, they were, you 
know. That was done immediately. Then we 
stopped while we were kind of waiting for 
Millet [UHP] to come up in his vehicle. We 
advised them of their Miranda rights. 
Q And at that time they were located in 
your patrol car? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did they make any statement to you? 
A No, sir. 
Q No statement at all? 
A Kirby asked if they knew who was in 
the other pickup, and they acted like they 
didn't have any knowledge of that. And so we 
didn't interrogate them. 
Transcript at 349-53: 
Q [Prosecutor during cross-examination 
of co-defendant Wade (Bartley did not 
testify)] With regard to any conversations 
you may have had there as you were picked up 
by Sheriff Wright and Officer Kirby, did you 
ever offer any explanation of your 
whereabouts that evening? 
MR. CHIARA: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. Did you 
ever offer any information as to your 
whereabouts that evening and why you were 
there? 
THE WITNESS: [Wade] No. 
Q (By Mr. Halls) Didn't you think that 
it was important to tell them that you had 
just gone to pick up another tank? That may 
have cleared this whole thing up? 
MR. ANDERSON: Objection, Your Honor. 
The prosecution is asking him to explain why 
he didn't volunteer some information to the 
police. He has no obligation to do that, and 
he's suggesting that the jury should draw a 
conclusion from that. 
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THE COURT: There's nothing wrong with 
that, Mr. Anderson. He's testified, and now 
he's subject to cross examination to give all 
of his explanations to this matter. So, the 
objection is overruled. He will be allowed 
to go into that, if you'd care to, Mr. Halls. 
Q (By Mr. Halls) Did you ever, at the 
jail or at any other time, offer any 
explanation to any authorities about your 
activities that night? 
A No. I thought it best to keep quiet. 
What they basically asked me was who was the 
third vehicle. There was no third vehicle. 
Q Okay. But did it ever come to your 
mind that if you were to offer some 
explanation to show them where you turned 
around in the road; to show them where you 
had pumped the fuel into your tank, that it 
may have cleared up some of the problems? 
MR. ANDERSON: I object on the grounds 
this isn't part of the cross examination. We 
never said anything about it. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. You 
can't have it both ways, you know. It's 
subject to cross examination; all the 
incidents that have any materiality to this 
thing whatsoever. 
MR. HALLS: Well, Mr. Anderson got into 
conversations about — 
THE COURT: It doesn't matter, Mr. Halls. 
Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: What was the question? 
Q (By Mr. Halls) Did it ever occur to 
you that by explaining, showing the officers 
where you turned around, where you 
transferred the fuel, those kinds of things, 
where your tire tracks were, that that may 
have cleared up some of your problems? 
A Well, once I was arrested — When you 
are pulled up in the middle of the night and 
there's no lights on the car and the red 
light comes on, you get a little concerned. 
And you get even more concerned when a 
shotgun is pointed on you. I didn't know 
what I had done. 
Q But your answer to the last question, 
then, is, I take it: no, it never occurred 
to you to explain that to the officer? 
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A Well, really, I was afraid to say 
anything. 
Q Okay. When you were arrested, did the 
officer tell you why you were arrested? Did 
he tell you you were being placed under 
arrest for theft of drip gas? 
A No. I didn't know any kind of crime 
had been committed. He just put me in the 
car. 
Q Then you went and looked at the scene 
and — 
A Yes. I was read my rights, and an 
hour later we road [sic] around in the car. 
Q Then you knew why you were being 
arrested? 
A. Yes. 
Q You knew you were being arrested for 
theft of drip gas? 
A Yes. 
Q And it still didn't occur to you to 
explain to the officer what you were doing 
there? 
A All they wanted to know — 
Q Did it or did it not occur to you to 
explain to the officer why you were there? 
A No. 
Relevant authorities: 
U.S. Const, amend. V (in relevant part): 
"No person shall be held to answer . . . nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." 
Utah Const, art I, § 12 (in relevant part): 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . . An accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself . . . ." 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (defendant must be 
advised of privilege against self incrimination prior to 
custodial interrogation to allow introduction of evidence at 
trial). 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutor's comment 
on defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent and 
failure to testify is constitutionally impermissible). 
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Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prosecutor may not cross 
examine defendant regarding postarrest silence). 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984) (eliciting evidence of 
a defendant's postarrest silence may violate the privilege 
against self-incrimination, but need not be prejudicial error). 
State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373 (Utah 1982) (comment on postarrest 
silence not error where necessary to clarify discrepancies 
regarding defendant's opportunity to provide information to 
authorities). See also State v. Singleton, 693 P.2d 68 (Utah 
1984); State v. Holes, 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982); State v. Urias, 
609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980). 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (if comments violate 
privilege against self-incrimination, standard of review for 
error of a constitutional dimension is whether it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
If you have questions or desire additional information, 
please contact me. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
tit Y$n~ />$/jv?fL— 
IBARA BEARNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
BB:bks 
cc: Craig Halls 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing letter of supplemental authorities was mailed, postage 
prepaid to Lyle R. Anderson, attorney for William Clifford 
Bartley, P. 0. Box 275, Monticello, UtafT)84535, on this 1st day 
of June, 1989. J ' ' 
